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MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
EDUCATION REFORM AND POWER-
SHARING IN AND AFTER INTRASTATE 
PEACE AGREEMENTS:  
A MULTI-METHODS STUDY
Giuditta Fontana
ABSTRACT
To what extent does the adoption of consociational power-sharing affect the design 
and implementation of education reforms? This article maps this territory through 
rich and detailed interviews collected in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2012-2013. Insights from these interviews are 
corroborated by evidence from the first large-scale dataset of educational provisions 
in intrastate peace settlements (the Political Agreements in Internal Conflict 
[PAIC] dataset). There is strong evidence that the values and practices of power-
sharing affect the implementation of education reforms: they constrain syncretistic 
(integrationist or assimilationist) initiatives and enable pluralistic reforms. Analysis 
of the PAIC dataset also suggests a relationship between the adoption of power-
sharing and the inclusion of education reforms in peace agreements: pacts including 
power-sharing are more likely to also include pluralistic education reforms. Beyond 
their implications for the theory and practice of postconflict education reform, 
these findings inform research on peace agreements and on the factors conducive 
to successful power-sharing.
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MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION REFORM AND POWER-
SHARING IN AND AFTER INTRASTATE PEACE AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
This article contributes to the mapping of the uncharted territory of how education 
reform is addressed in peace agreements and how it is implemented after their 
ratification. In the context of increasing adoption of consociational power-sharing1 
“almost as a panacea” (Binningsbø 2013, 89) for societies experiencing violent 
conflict (Bieber and Keil 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), this study addresses a 
fundamental question: To what extent does the adoption of consociational power-
sharing constrain the type of education reforms included in peace agreements, 
and their implementation? 
Previous efforts to “turn from the world of best practice to the world of political 
feasibility” (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002, 3) in the study of peace 
agreements and their aftermath have focused on the inclusion and implementation 
of core political and security provisions (Wallensteen and Eriksson 2009; Hampson 
1996; Walter 2002; Stedman et al. 2002; Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015; Jarstad 
and Nilsson 2008) while overlooking the reform of social institutions, such as 
education. 
Nevertheless, it is widely established that education systems reflect and reproduce 
conflict and inequality (Burde et al. 2017; Smith and Vaux 2003). Recent research 
and policy reiterate that education reform is instrumental in promoting the 
transition out of intrastate conflict (Burde et al. 2017; Dryden-Peterson 2016; 
GIZ 2014; Smith and Vaux 2003; UNICEF 2011). Several qualitative studies also 
suggest that constitutional structures affect education policy (Fontana 2016; King 
2014; Shanks 2015). However, despite the growing body of research that explores 
the complexities of education reform in conflict-affected societies, important 
gaps remain in our understanding of the nexus between education, conflict, and 
peace-building (UNESCO 2016). 
The existing comparative politics literature proposes how the adoption of 
consociational power-sharing (hereafter power-sharing) could impact education 
reform and how education reform may enhance the stability and legitimacy of 
power-sharing.2 It suggests that education systems in societies adopting power-
sharing will gravitate toward pluralism, in which separate institutions serve 
1 As the literature review explains, consociational power-sharing includes four institutional mechanisms: 
executive power-sharing, veto rights, proportionality, and communal autonomy (Lijphart 1977; McGarry and 
O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; O’Leary 2006).
2 This article uses “power-sharing” and “consociational power-sharing” interchangeably, as further 
explored in the literature review, despite the existence of many types of power-sharing (for other types of 
power-sharing, see Binningsbø 2013).
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different and homogeneous groups, rather than syncretism, which is characterized 
by single institutions and overarching narratives, whether imposed or consensual 
(Lijphart 1977, 2008). 
This study tests such expectations. It draws from interview data collected in 2012-
2013 in three postconflict societies that have adopted power-sharing: Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter 
Macedonia).3 These data complement cross-tabulations of the first large-scale 
dataset of education reforms in intrastate peace agreements (Fontana et al. 2018). 
The rich and detailed data presented in this paper indicate that the majority of 
peace agreements include syncretistic education reforms, regardless of whether 
they also include power-sharing. However, agreements that do adopt power-
sharing are more likely to include pluralistic education reforms than those that 
do not. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the values and practices of power-
sharing affect the implementation of peace agreements: they constrain syncretistic 
education reforms while enabling pluralistic initiatives. These findings add to the 
literature on peace agreements and on comparative education by showing that 
the adoption of power-sharing affects both the design and the implementation 
of the education reforms included in negotiated settlements. They also provide 
important insights into conflict management; they suggest, for example, that 
pluralistic education policies establish the legitimacy and stability of both liberal 
and corporate varieties of power-sharing, at least in the short term.
The following section provides a brief theoretical overview that locates this article 
at the intersection of studies of peace agreements, comparative education, and 
power-sharing. The article then presents the selection of case studies and methods. 
The fourth section explores education reforms in intrastate peace agreements 
and the fifth investigates the implementation of educational initiatives after the 
establishment of power-sharing. The concluding section maps avenues for future 
research.
EDUCATION AND POWER-SHARING: WHAT WE KNOW
Existing studies of intrastate peace agreements have identified a number of factors 
that influence their design, including the key issues at stake in the conflict, the 
presence of international mediators, the inclusiveness of the peace process, and 
3 The data in these 75 interviews informed some previously published studies, which, however, do not 
employ the quantitative evidence drawn from the new dataset of Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts.
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the timing of the agreement (Wallensteen and Eriksson 2009). Similar factors also 
constrain the implementation of the political, military, and security provisions of 
peace agreements. Other factors that affect the implementation of negotiated pacts 
include the regional and international environment (Hampson 1996; Walter 2002; 
Stedman et al. 2002), the commitment of local actors and the presence of spoilers 
(Stedman et al. 2002), the strength of security guarantees (Walter 2002), and 
the quality of the peace agreements themselves (Stedman et al. 2002). However, 
previous studies have largely overlooked the inclusion and implementation of 
reforms other than core political and security provisions, including education 
system reforms.4
This omission has occured despite the fact that mechanisms like education 
reform are crucial to the long-term resilience of peace. International documents 
present the provision of formal education as important to the transition out 
of civil war (UNICEF 2011; World Education Forum 2000; see also Burde et 
al. 2011), and previous studies suggest that peace agreements are no exception 
(Dupuy 2008). While it would be simplistic to assume that a lack of education 
leads directly to violent conflict (Smith and Vaux 2003), it appears that a lack of 
schooling can exacerbate animosities and pave the way for them to escalate into 
violence, as a lower level of education is correlated with an increased willingness 
to resort to violence in interpersonal conflicts (GIZ 2014). Recent studies have 
also suggested that increased access to education helps maintain peace (Burde 
et al. 2017; Ishiyama and Breuning 2012).
The kind of education provided is equally important. Formal education may 
perpetuate a conflict, as it can entrench and compound socioeconomic inequality 
and frustration by denying access to schooling, which can lead to an unequally 
qualified citizenry and divergent employment opportunities (Davies 2004; 
Gallagher 2005; GIZ 2014; King 2014; Novelli and Higgins 2016; Smith and Vaux 
2003; UNICEF 2011). It can also nourish the mutually exclusive and intolerant 
identities that can be mobilized in a conflict (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 
2004; GIZ 2014; Gallagher 2004; Niens and Cairns 2005). In postconflict societies, 
schools may continue to produce and reproduce antagonistic narratives and 
identities even after the conclusion of a peace agreement, thereby nurturing 
conflict “even after the initial, objective causes have become irrelevant” (Taush, 
Schmidt, and Hewstone 2009, 75; see also King 2014; Burde et al. 2017). 
4 The Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi 2015) provides some data on the implementation of 51 provisions 
in 42 comprehensive peace accords, including educational provisions, but these data were not analyzed 
comparatively to date. Dupuy (2008) provides a snapshot of the education reforms in 144 peace agreements 
(1989-2005), but she does not differentiate between intrastate and interstate peace agreements.
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While there is broad agreement that the potential of education is not fully exploited 
in promoting peace (GIZ 2004; Novelli, Lopes-Cardozo, and Smith 2017; Smith 
and Vaux 2003; UNESCO 2016), the field is only starting to produce systematic and 
empirically tested overarching theories (most notably Novelli et al. 2017). A variety 
of case studies and policy papers do identify potentially important education 
reforms. For example, beneficial changes to an education system’s governance 
structures would address unequal access to education, promote mixing children 
from different backgrounds, and foster participatory and democratic decision-
making (Niens and Cairns 2005; Paolini et al. 2004; Novelli et al. 2017; Burde 
et al. 2017). Reform of educational budgets and financing could make funding 
distribution more transparent and equitable (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith 
and Vaux 2003), and the manifest and hidden curricula could be designed to 
teach minority languages and to educate students about plurality of identity, 
tolerance, the roots of conflict, and citizens’ rights and relationship to the state 
(GIZ 2014; Paulson 2015; Williams 2014; Novelli et al. 2017; see also UNESCO 
2011; UNICEF 2011). Choices made in the immediate aftermath of violent conflicts 
tend to solidify quickly (Davies 2004; Dryden-Peterson 2016; GIZ 2014), and 
these studies identify a favorable window of opportunity for the development of 
conflict-sensitive education systems in the immediate postconflict phase.
However, successive calls for educational programs rooted in comprehensive 
conflict analysis and for the identification of political and economic influences 
on the implementation of educational initiatives are only starting to be addressed 
(UNICEF 2011; UNESCO 2016). Little is currently known about how political 
influences affect the design and implementation of educational programs (Smith 
and Vaux 2003). This gap is surprising, as it is well established that curricula, 
school structures, and schooling practices tend to reflect and reproduce the core 
principles and hierarchies of a state, thereby helping to legitimize and embed 
political systems (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Easton 1969). At the same time, 
widespread consensus about the legitimacy and the very existence of a state and 
its political system are instrumental to long-term stability and to the prevention 
of violent conflict (Easton 1969; Green 1997). 
The present study employs a novel dataset and in-depth interviews to examine the 
extent to which the nature of the political system established by a peace agreement 
(consociational power-sharing) affects the adoption of specific education reforms 
in that agreement, and their ultimate implementation. 
FONTANA
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Consociational power-sharing provides an ideal model for examining political 
constraints on education reforms for two main reasons. First, the existing 
literature generates some clear expectations about power-sharing’s relationship 
with education reform (summarized in Table 1). Consociational power-sharing 
involves four basic institutional mechanisms: executive power-sharing (a grand 
coalition or cross-community government founded on the principle of joint 
consent); veto rights or weighted majority rule; proportionality in the electoral 
system, in the allocation of cabinet and parliamentary seats, and in the distribution 
of funding; and extensive autonomy for previously warring communities (Lijphart 
1977; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; O’Leary 2006; for other types of power-
sharing, see Binningsbø 2013). Recent advances in the practice and theory of 
power-sharing have identified two main varieties: corporate power-sharing, 
which accommodates communities according to predetermined, permanent, and 
internally homogeneous communal identities (O’Leary 2006; Wolff 2011); and 
liberal power-sharing, which “rewards whatever salient political identities emerge 
in democratic elections” (McGarry and O’Leary 2007, 675). As Table 1 shows, 
in accommodationist political systems based on power-sharing (McGarry and 
O’Leary 1994), education reforms are expected to gravitate toward pluralism (with 
separate institutions serving different groups) rather than syncretism (with mixed 
institutions and overarching narratives) (Lijphart 1977, 2008; see also Smith and 
Vaux 2003). Previous case studies of education reforms after a conflict suggest 
that this is the case (Fontana 2016).
Table 1: Education Reform and Power-Sharing. Expectations from the 
Literature
Relationship between multidimensional power-sharing and education reform
Present Not Present
Pe
ac
e 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t
Text
Peace agreement(s) that include 
power-sharing are more likely 
to include pluralistic provisions.
Peace agreement(s) that include 
power-sharing are equally or 
less likely to include pluralistic 
provisions.
Implementation
Pluralistic provisions are more 
likely to be implemented in 
jurisdictions that adopt power-
sharing.
Pluralistic provisions are less or 
equally likely to be implemented in 
jurisdictions that adopt power-
sharing.
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Second, power-sharing is an increasingly common approach to the management 
of intrastate conflicts: the UN Peacemaker dataset (2018) confirms that about one-
third of intrastate framework agreements finalized since the late 1990s contain 
provisions for political power-sharing, up from less than one-fifth of those 
finalized in the 1980s. Critics of power-sharing assert that it freezes and enhances 
the cleavages that underpin a conflict in the first place, thereby hampering long-
term transition (Finlay 2010; Taylor 2006; Horowitz 2014; Binningsbø 2013). 
Proponents, however, argue that power-sharing, particularly its liberal variety, 
facilitates long-term conflict resolution and the emergence of overarching identities 
(Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 
Sisk 1996). Recent works have identified important determinants of the success of 
power-sharing as a conflict-management tool, including the quality of institutional 
regimes (Schneckener 2002), the balance of military forces (Mukherjee 2006), 
the determination of external actors and local elites (Bieber and Keil 2009), and 
the type of power-sharing adopted on the spectrum from liberal to corporate 
(Cammett and Maleski 2012; O’Leary 2006; Wolff 2011; McGarry and O’Leary 
2007). These works have largely overlooked education’s potential contribution 
to successful conflict management through power-sharing, despite the implicit 
expectation that “voluntary self-segregation” into separate and equal schools may 
reduce the potential for intergroup clashes, improve communal cohesion, and 
enhance elite legitimacy (Lijphart 1977, 2008, 70). This study employs a new large-
scale database and existing qualitative evidence to address this gap, and to identify 
implications for the broader research and practice into education and conflict.
METHODS
This article focuses on formal education reforms explicitly codified in peace 
agreements that establish power-sharing; it considers all educational institutions 
from primary school to university. Other studies have looked at broader postconflict 
education reforms in societies that have adopted power-sharing (Fontana 2016; 
Shanks 2015), but none has focused on the specific clauses mapped by the 
agreements. Without underestimating the importance of informal education for 
peace-building processes, this paper focuses on formal education, as it reflects 
the principal concerns of the academic and policy community (GIZ 2014; Smith 
and Vaux 2003).
FONTANA
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Case Selection
This study is grounded in the analysis of a large-scale dataset of intrastate 
agreements and complemented by qualitative evidence from Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland, and Macedonia. Education policies are notoriously slow to embed, so their 
implementation can only be investigated robustly where agreements have held for 
longer than ten years.5 According to the Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts 
(PAIC) dataset, of the 17 peace processes that included multiple dimensions of 
power-sharing and extensive education reforms, only seven lasted longer than 
ten years.6
Lebanon’s Taif Agreement (TA), Macedonia’s Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), 
and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement (GFA) are representative of these 
cases and of divided societies more generally in several respects.7 First, they are 
comprehensive agreements negotiated in the absence of a clear military victory. 
The three cases represent conflicts of different intensity and duration. Lebanon’s 
1975-1989 civil war resulted in more than 100,000 fatalities—more than 7 percent 
of the Lebanese population. As much as one-quarter of Lebanon’s population 
was internally displaced or fled the country during the war (Makdisi and Sadaka 
2002, 23). Northern Ireland’s “Troubles” affected the region between 1968 and 
1998, resulting in approximately 3,500 fatalities (Sutton 2018). Macedonia’s ethnic 
conflict affected the country between February and August 2001, causing 150-
250 deaths and approximately 140,000 internally displaced persons (Ripiloski 
2011, 100-101).
Second, these constituencies’ ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages “are 
politically salient—that is, they are persistent markers of political identity and basis 
for political mobilisation” (Choudhry 2008, 5). In Lebanon, religious affiliation 
is paramount and political power is shared among 18 official religious sects. The 
5 The Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi 2015) traces the implementation of education reforms in 42 
comprehensive peace accords and shows that—in contrast to political and military reforms that are typically 
implemented immediately—education reforms are typically implemented between three and seven years 
after the conclusion of the agreement (when they are implemented at all). The survival of an agreement for 
ten years would provide an opportunity to implement and embed some education reforms.
6 The seven cases in question are Angola’s 2006 Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National 
Reconciliation in the Cabinda Province; Bangladesh’s 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord; El Salvador’s 
peace process (Chapultepec Peace Agreement, New York Act II, Mexico Agreement, New York Act, Acuerdo 
Complementarion del 22 de Diciembre de 1992 Acuerdo de la Reunion Tripartita, Timetable for the 
Implementation of the most Important Agreements Pending, Acuerdo Complementario del 5 Frebrero de 
1993); Lebanon’s Taif Agreement; Macedonia’s 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement; Niger’s Accord établissant 
une paix définitive entre le Gouvernement de la République du Niger et l’Organisation de la Résistance Armée 
(O.R.A.); and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement.
7 Northern Ireland’s “Agreement Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations” is also known as the Belfast 
Agreement and, perhaps most accurately, as the British-Irish Agreement. See O’Leary (1999).
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salience of the Muslim-Christian divide (crucial until the end of the civil war) was 
recently overshadowed by mounting Sunni-Shia tensions (Beydoun 2007; Knudsen 
and Kerr 2013). In Northern Ireland, confessional affiliation overlaps with national 
and political cleavages, which creates two triadic identities: Protestant-Unionist-
British and Catholic-Nationalist-Irish. In Macedonia, language and ethnicity (the 
primary markers of identity there) overlap with religious differences between 
Macedonians and Albanians (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office 2002). 
Consequently, the conflicts in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia can 
all be broadly identified as identity based.
Third, these cases represent different varieties of power-sharing: Lebanon is a case 
of corporate power-sharing, while Macedonia and Northern Ireland approximate 
liberal power-sharing. Including cases along the full liberal-corporate spectrum 
speaks to the debate about the long-term societal impact of different varieties of 
power-sharing (Horowitz 2014; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b; Taylor 2006). 
Finally, the substantial educational provisions in the TA, OFA, and GFA encompass 
the breadth of tools available for the reform of formal education in the aftermath 
of intrastate conflicts, from expanding access to reforming curricula to altering 
educational governance. These characteristics make Lebanon, Northern Ireland, 
and Macedonia particularly suitable to a study of political constraints on education 
reform and make the present findings relevant beyond the three case studies.
Research Methods
Cross-tabulations of the PAIC dataset were used to place the qualitative evidence 
in a wider comparative context to determine whether a relationship exists between 
two dimensions of intrastate peace agreements, multi-dimensional power-
sharing and different types of education reform. The PAIC dataset includes 
293 negotiated agreements concluded between 1989 and 2016 with the intent 
to end or ameliorate a violent conflict through institutional reform. It includes 
both partial and comprehensive agreements but excludes simple ceasefires, pre-
negotiation documents, procedural agreements, and unilateral declarations (for 
more details and descriptive statistics, see Fontana et al. 2018). In this sense, the 
PAIC dataset expands on existing efforts to map education provisions included 
in peace agreements but focuses explicitly on intrastate conflict (cf. Dupuy 2008). 
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To create the dataset, the available intrastate peace agreements (including the 
TA, GFA, and OFA) were read and coded into binary categories along the two 
dimensions of interest. In the power-sharing dimensions, those including multiple 
dimensions of power-sharing were coded 1 and those not including multiple 
dimensions were coded 0. In the education reform dimension, those including 
education reform were coded 1 and those excluding education reform were 
coded 0. The educational clauses were then coded into two further categories: 
syncretistic (S) and pluralistic (P). This coding follows previous categorizations of 
educational provisions and wider political systems (see, e.g., Smith and Vaux 2003; 
McGarry and O’Leary 1994; for a comprehensive overview of the PAIC coding 
protocol, see Fontana et al. 2018). After coding, the agreements were divided 
into four groups: those including no education reforms (0), those including only 
syncretistic education reforms (1S), those including only pluralistic reforms (1P), 
and those including both pluralistic and syncretistic reforms (1B). Using Excel, 
cross-tabulations for power-sharing and varieties of education reform were created 
for these data (see Table 2 for results).
Rather than taking the promises of peace agreements at face value, the second 
part of this article uses qualitative evidence to investigate the extent to which 
postconflict education policies in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia were 
either constrained or enabled by the core values and practices of power-sharing. 
The fine-grained analysis of education reforms implemented after the TA, GFA, 
and OFA was completed through 48 semi-structured interviews carried out by 
the author during research visits to the three countries in 2012-2013. Interviewees 
included government members, political party spokespersons, bureaucrats in the 
education ministries and management organizations, scholars and curriculum 
writers, officers in international organizations, members of NGOs, and journalists. 
They included members of all the main communities and political parties, as well 
as international observers (see Appendix 2 for more details). 
The author listened to the recorded interviews and field notes, transcribed the 
interviews, and read the transcript multiple times to identify overarching and 
cross-case themes within a list of broader categories based on the existing literature 
on education and conflict (Miles and Huberman 1994). The author manually 
coded the interviews and analyzed them in parallel with the data collection. 
Quotations included in this article were chosen during a final read through the 
transcripts. This process was very time intensive, but it gave the author a full 
appreciation of the rich and complex data collected during fieldwork (Basit 2003).
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EDUCATION REFORM IN PEACE AGREEMENTS
According to the PAIC dataset (Fontana et al. 2018), just over a quarter of all the 
intrastate peace agreements concluded globally between 1989 and 2016 addressed 
education reform (about 28 percent). The dataset also shows that peace agreements 
that included multiple dimensions of power-sharing were considerably more 
likely also to address education policy (50 percent).8 In contrast, less than one-
quarter of the agreements that included less than two power-sharing provisions 
also addressed education reforms (23.4 percent). The data suggest a relationship 
between the inclusion of constitutional reforms broadly identifiable as power-
sharing and the mapping of education reforms. In other words, the PAIC 
dataset confirms that education reform is a useful complement to power-sharing 
(cf. Fontana 2016). 
On the one hand, the evidence suggests that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the breadth and depth of education reform between agreements that 
include multiple dimensions of power-sharing and those that do not (see Appendix 
1). On the other hand, the data indicate that power-sharing is associated with 
different types of educational prescriptions, on a spectrum from syncretistic to 
pluralistic initiatives. Most agreements that include education reforms include a 
majority of syncretistic provisions, regardless of their constitutional arrangements. 
However, agreements that prescribe multiple dimensions of power-sharing are 
substantially more likely to prescribe both syncretistic and pluralistic reforms 
than their counterparts (see Table 2). In other words, when agreements include 
extensive power-sharing they are also more likely to include pluralistic educational 
provisions.
Table 2: Number of Intrastate Peace Agreements Concluded between 1989 
and 2016, Including Education Reforms and Power-Sharing
8 A peace agreement includes multiple dimensions of power-sharing if it addresses at least two out of 
the five categories of political, military, legislative, civil service, and economic power-sharing, as recorded 
in the PAIC dataset (Fontana et al. 2018).
None
0
Syncretistic
1S
Pluralistic
1P
Both
1B Total
No Multi-dimensional 
Power-Sharing 0 183 42 1 13 239
Multi-dimensional 
Power-Sharing 1 27 14 1 12 54
Total 210 56 2 25 293
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A fine-grained analysis of the TA, GFA, and OFA corroborates the findings 
above. As mentioned, the agreements created to manage the conflicts in Lebanon, 
Northern Ireland, and Macedonia are examples of intrastate peace agreements 
that include multiple dimensions of power-sharing and extensive education 
reforms and have lasted longer than ten years. As such, they are ideal cases for 
testing the relationship between power-sharing and education reform in conflict-
affected places. As Table 3 shows, the three agreements contain a number of 
pluralistic provisions that directly address the demands of the conflicting parties. 
This evidence corroborates the hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
the inclusion of power-sharing and the nature of education reforms in peace 
agreements. However, the TA, OFA, and GFA also map a number of syncretistic 
reforms (as do most peace agreements in the PAIC dataset; cf. Table 2). Fine-
grained qualitative research helps make sense of provisions that contradict the 
pluralistic governance arrangements.
Table 3: Syncretistic and Pluralistic Educational Provisions in the TA, GFA, 
and OFA
Syncretistic Pluralistic
Taif 
Agreement
Strengthen state control over private schools and 
textbooks
Review and develop curricula to strengthen national 
belonging, fusion, and openness
Unify the textbooks for history and citizenship education
Provide free and compulsory elementary education
Reform and strengthen vocational education
Reform and aid the Lebanese University
Freedom of education
Freedom of religious 
education
Protection of private 
education
Good Friday 
Agreement Facilitate and encourage integrated education
Freedom of education
Freedom of religious 
education
Protection of private 
education
Ohrid Framework 
Agreement
Uniform standards for academic programs
Positive discrimination for members of non-majority 
communities in university enrolment
Macedonian language teaching for all pupils (Article 48)
Mother-tongue 
education in primary 
and secondary school
State funding for 
university education 
in languages spoken 
by 20 percent of the 
population
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Macedonia’s experience suggests that education reforms may signal a shifting 
intercommunal balance of power. The OFA’s pluralistic reforms were clear 
concessions to the Albanian insurgency, which during the 2001 conflict had 
explicitly demanded mother-tongue instruction at all education levels (Ripiloski 
2011; Karajkov 2005; Rosūlek 2011). As the drafter of the Strategy for Integrated 
Education put it,
if I’m to exaggerate a little bit, most reforms prescribed by the 
Ohrid Agreement were already in the make. Minus language, 
which the Macedonians would never have agreed [to] . . . never, 
never, over the prime minister’s dead body. He said it like that. 
(Interview 15)
The agreement also leans in a syncretistic direction by entrenching the right 
to learn the official state language (Macedonian) at all levels of education and 
establishing quotas for the number of ethnic minority students attending 
Macedonian-language universities (Ohrid Framework Agreement [OFA] 2001). 
This compromise between the demands of ethnic Albanians and those of ethnic 
Macedonians echoes the accommodationist rationale of power-sharing and 
explains the inclusion of both pluralistic and syncretistic reforms in the OFA 
(see Table 3).
Lebanon’s TA also includes both syncretistic and pluralistic reforms to 
accommodate a shifting balance of intercommunal power. Muslims there had 
long advocated for the unification of history and civic education curricula and 
textbooks under state supervision (Interview 40). They largely blamed the private 
religious schools for promoting widely “different identities” (Interview 19). A Druze 
member of the advisory committee on history books drew a direct connection 
between the fragmented education system and the Lebanese civil war: “The main 
source of disturbance . . . was the huge diversity of public and religious schools . . . 
This created difference in the moral and ethical outlook of the Lebanese.” The 
temporary weakness of the divided Christian communities at the end of the civil 
war provided an ideal opportunity to advance this integrationist aim, thus the TA 
called for schools to “strengthen national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural 
openness” through unified history curricula and textbooks and envisaged the 
establishment of state control over private schools. However, these syncretistic 
aims were tempered by clear concessions to the Christian communities and their 
longstanding advocacy for educational pluralism. Thus, as outlined in Table 3, the 
TA provides for the protection of “freedom of education,” “freedom of religious 
education,” and “private education” (Taif Agreement [TA] 1989). 
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Education is more marginal to the GFA, with a brief syncretistic pledge to 
“facilitate and encourage” integrated education (The Agreement Reached in the 
Multi-Party Negotiations [GFA] 1998), promoted primarily by smaller mixed 
negotiating parties (BBC 2017). In contrast, the GFA’s pluralistic support of Irish-
medium schools responded to the demands of Irish Nationalists (see Table 3).
In sum, analysis of the PAIC data shows that when peace agreements include 
education reforms they are most likely to be syncretistic. However, the agreements 
that include multi-dimensional power-sharing are more likely to also include 
pluralistic reforms. This finding partially corroborates the existing literature’s 
identification of a relationship between power-sharing and educational provisions 
that potentially leads to “voluntary self-segregation” across liberal and corporate 
cases of power-sharing (Lijphart 2008, 70).
The qualitative analysis above also suggests that compromises between negotiating 
parties explain the uneasy coexistence of syncretistic and pluralistic provisions 
in the same text. Education reforms are subject to the same bargaining processes 
as other communal interests during peace negotiations. As a consequence of the 
hard compromises involved in the establishment of power-sharing, education 
clauses in the three peace agreements analyzed reflect the aggregation of the 
diverse interests of previously warring groups, rather than their genuine synthesis. 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON POSTCONFLICT EDUCATION REFORM
Stedman et al. (2002) suggest that peace agreements that have inconsistencies are 
less likely to be implemented. As seen in Table 3, the education reforms mapped 
in the TA, GFA, and OFA are rather inconsistent. For example, the TA vows to 
protect private education while at the same time establishing state control over all 
private schools. Analysis of the interviews collected in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, 
and Macedonia confirms that implementation of the education reforms postulated 
in the TA, GFA, and OFA is patchy.9 This section traces the implementation of 
selected education reforms in Lebanon, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland in 
order to identify common patterns across the three case studies.
9 This article focuses only on the education reforms codified in the TA, GFA, and OFA. Other studies 
have looked at education policy more generally (Fontana 2016).
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The Implementation of Lebanon’s Taif Agreement
In Lebanon, education reforms remain among the many unfulfilled promises of 
the TA. Whereas pluralistic provisions were largely implemented, this was not 
the case for the syncretistic clauses, including clauses that called for the drafting 
and dissemination of a unified history curriculum and textbook. A politician 
and member of the advisory committee on history books recalled that “before 
the Taif agreement the history book was biased [in favor of the Maronites], since 
the Lebanese president back then had many privileges.” He went on to explain 
that unified history books were key to “developing the national spirit in the 
Lebanese” (Interview 35). A former education minister similarly reflected that 
the TA’s education reforms aimed to disseminate “common principles . . . such as 
freedom, respect for others’ opinions, forgiveness, openness to others, equality, 
understanding of democracy . . . [and] the meaning of citizenship.” The minister 
asserted that a unified history curriculum would “help the Lebanese understand 
their history on the right foundations and not . . . [based on] political points of 
view” (Interview 41). 
However, Lebanon to this day lacks a unified history curriculum, and different 
schools teach about the past based on more than 28 textbook series (Abouchedid, 
Nasser, and Blommestein 2002; Abouchedid and Nasser 2000). A former director 
of the Centre for Educational Research and Development (CERD) reflected that 
persisting political controversies over the history curricula are ultimately “about 
[politicians] having their share in history and being presented positively” (Interview 
19). History textbooks consider history only up to Lebanese independence in 1943, 
effectively amplifying the institutional silence over Lebanon’s recent past, its civil 
wars, and its current political configuration. A local expert reflected that:
that gaping hole has allowed different interpretations of history 
and competing interpretations of that history to come in.  
And . . . because they’re being taught in a void, you 
have generations that . . . are learning a history that is . . .  
the perspective of their particular community and not  
the perspective of other communities. (Interview 23)
What explains the sidelining of the TA’s promise for unified history textbooks? 
The interviewees explained it primarily by referring to the values and norms of the 
politics of power-sharing. The promotion of “national fusion” (TA 1989) through 
education clashed directly with the logic of a pluralist political system founded 
on the autonomy of equal communities. Conversely, as Interview 23 underscores, 
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the institutional silence over Lebanon’s recent past legitimizes the autonomous 
histories of previously warring communities and furthers the socialization of 
children into separate and potentially antagonistic narratives. Abouchedid et al. 
(2002) demonstrate that teachers and textbooks portrayed past events such as 
the French Mandate differently, depending on their communal affiliation. Thus 
the pluralistic education system strengthens the previously warring political and 
religious communities of Lebanon (Interview 19; Interview 21). Interview 23 
traced this process clearly:
Because there’s this gaping hole, it’s opened the door for these 
different communities to teach that particular history of 
Lebanon in the way they see fit . . . So the result is . . . [that] we 
asked them [3,000 14-year-old students] two questions: who 
is your favourite political leader and who is your favourite 
historical leader. These kids could not tell the difference for 
the most part between what is a historic leader or a historic 
figure, and what is a political leader . . . And the answer would 
be depending on their sectarian affiliation. 
The sidelining of the TA’s syncretistic educational provisions appears to contribute 
to the entrenchment of the equality and autonomy of Lebanon’s communities, 
thereby embedding the core values that underpin power-sharing.
More implicitly, the evidence collected in Lebanon points to the decision-making 
structures and core practices of power-sharing as an important constraint on the 
implementation of syncretistic education reforms. In the aftermath of conflict, 
the inclusive structures of power-sharing were reproduced at most levels of the 
administration, including by committees in charge of education reforms. For 
example, committees that included representatives of all the main Lebanese 
religious and political groupings were tasked with producing the common history 
curriculum and drafting a unified textbook in 1999-2001 (Frayha 2004; Interview 
19). As a former director of CERD admitted, “I’m not proud of it, it’s not pure 
academia” (Interview 19). In other words, he suggested that consensual and 
inclusive curriculum-drafting procedures may undermine the academic rigor 
of the textbooks. However, another former CERD director reflected that only 
a curriculum and textbooks that emerge with the consensus of all previously 
warring groups would be acceptable in every school (Interview 21). 
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Inclusivity was not sufficient. When the first common history textbooks were 
printed and distributed in 2001, controversy ensued over the portrayal of the 
events of 636 a.d. as an “Arab conquest” (Interview 19; Interview 35). As the then 
education minister said in an interview, “This is wrong; there was Arab existence 
in Lebanon, it was not a conquest” (Interview 34). Others who participated in the 
drafting process note that members of the drafting committee deeply disagreed 
about the interpretation of some past identity-sensitive events. A senior officer of 
CERD is one crucial example: “When I say that Jesus Christ was crucified, the 
Muslims don’t accept it, the Quran is different.” These controversies resulted in 
the withdrawal of all textbooks and of the common curriculum. 
A new draft history curriculum was presented to the Lebanese cabinet in 2011. 
As in other societies that have adopted corporate power-sharing, the Lebanese 
cabinet is a grand coalition of representatives from all the main religious and 
political groups. One member of the advisory committee on history books 
reported that “every minister wanted to add points to the book to support his 
sect” (Interview 35). Negotiations broke down over the proper designation of the 
mass demonstrations following Rafic Hariri’s assassination, which led to Syria’s 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 (Daily Star 2012). Tensions spilled over into 
violent street demonstrations. Unable to mediate an agreement, Prime Minister 
Najib Mikati declared a moratorium on the history curricula and textbooks (Daily 
Star 2012). 
In both instances, the curricula and textbooks were expected to be formulated 
through inclusive and consensual institutions that enabled representatives of 
each community and political party to safeguard their core identity-forming 
narratives. Debates within these consensual institutions mirrored wider clashes 
over the identity of the Lebanese people and the contributions Lebanon’s various 
communities made to the state, ref lected shifting political cleavages, and, 
ultimately, explained the deadlock over Lebanon’s history curriculum. 
Lebanon’s experience confirms the expectations expressed in the literature 
(Lijphart 2008). In this case of corporate power-sharing, power-sharing affected 
the implementation of education reforms through its core political values and 
decision-making practices. It did so by entrenching consensual and inclusive 
decision-making practices and (implicitly and explicitly) reaffirming the equal 
legitimacy of communal narratives of the past.
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The Implementation of Macedonia’s Ohrid Framework Agreement
If the attempt to formulate unified history curricula and textbooks in Lebanon 
epitomizes the difficulty in furthering a syncretistic agenda in a society adopting 
power-sharing, the implementation of the OFA’s educational provisions exemplifies 
the ease in promoting pluralistic initiatives, even in a case of liberal power-sharing. 
The OFA provided for the expansion of mother-tongue education in primary 
and secondary schools, and for state funding for Albanian-language university 
education (OFA 2001). These reforms were implemented swiftly and successfully. 
For example, by 2004, two state universities, the South East European University 
and the University of Tetovo, were teaching in the Albanian language. Combined 
with the introduction of quotas for students of ethnic minority background 
in Macedonian-language universities, this led to a threefold increase in the 
proportion of ethnic Albanian students in the state’s universities between 2001 
and 2004 (Ragaru 2008). Successive power-sharing governments also expanded 
access to education for students of minority backgrounds by making secondary 
education free and compulsory and lowering the threshold for the number of 
children required to open an Albanian-language class (Interview 45; Myhrvold 
2005). A former education minister also recalls that, “in order to attract more 
students we provided better opportunities . . . We built some buildings for the 
secondary schools in Tetovo, in Skopje. That infrastructure was lacking for 
secondary education” (Interview 46). 
These initiatives were concrete testimony of the new political equality between 
ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. However, the expansion of Albanian-
language education and the creation of a full educational pathway in the Albanian 
language helped turn previously mixed-ethnicity schools into “parallel, non-
intersecting communities” (Myhrvold 2005, 18; Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] 2010). Oversubscription and some violent incidents 
encouraged schools to create separate shifts and satellite buildings for students 
studying in the two languages, and to separate students on the basis of their 
language of instruction (Lyon 2011; OSCE 2010). An official in an international 
mission explained the process, reflecting on its relationship with the wider politics 
of power-sharing: 
What we’re finding is that we have schools that suddenly 
receive a petition from parents or teachers or students asking 
for the shifts to be organized by language . . . What are the 
reasons behind this? Preemptive strike, because maybe there 
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might be a fight . . . The concept is separate but equal. It’s not 
reconciliation, dialogue, and cooperation . . . There was a fight 
in a school yard, we don’t talk about it, we don’t discuss it, 
we don’t bring the parents, we don’t bring anyone in. We have 
video cameras, we have a security guard, and we separate the 
kids. So, yes, the fights might stop, but what kind of society 
are we creating that it fears dialogue . . . fears debate . . . fears 
confronting even something as silly as a school fight? . . . Many 
of these school fights aren’t even ethnic-based. (Interview 24)
The number of monolingual schools also expanded: the proportion of Albanian 
children studying in monolingual schools grew from about 65 percent in 2000 to 
about 70 percent in 2008 (UNICEF 2009). Thus, the implementation of the OFA’s 
pluralistic provisions has served to entrench and legitimize the cultural autonomy 
of the Albanian community in Macedonia while reproducing the “concept [of] 
separate but equal” (Interview 24).
In fact, the OFA and Macedonia’s constitution guarantee the right to learn 
Macedonian at all levels of education. However, children studying in Albanian, 
Serbian, and Turkish do not start Macedonian lessons until fourth grade, and 
then for only two hours per week. There is broad agreement that ethnic Albanians’ 
declining competence in the state language is potentially detrimental to their 
long-term employment prospects: one interviewee reflected that this is because 
“[minorities] don’t have their own economy” (Interview 38). Several other 
interviewees echoed this perspective, warning that mass unemployment can in 
turn destabilize interethnic relations (Interview 11; Interview 25; Interview 26).
In an attempt to implement the teaching of Macedonian outside the inclusive, 
consensual structures of postconflict power-sharing, the education minister 
announced in 2009 that every child would learn Macedonian beginning in first 
grade. He justified this unilateral decision by referring to a new, internationally 
sponsored strategy for integrated education. In fact, the drafter of the strategy 
reflected that introducing Macedonian instruction in first grade “was a little 
political stunt by the minister who made a major mistake . . . [He] hit a tsunami 
of resistance” (Interview 15). An education expert at the Open Society Foundation 
echoes this observation: “The bomb fell. In the middle of the school year the 
minister decided that the Albanians should learn Macedonian and . . . it was 
disaster” (Interview 37). 
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As an official in an international organization put it, when it comes to language 
learning, “nobody wants to be . . . given orders” (Interview 26). Ethnic Albanians 
interpreted the initiative as a “pure provocation based on ethnic dominance” 
(Interview 12). Parents and teachers protested and promoted a boycott of the 
Macedonian language classes. A government crisis developed between the ethnic 
Macedonian majority party and its ethnic Albanian coalition partner, while the 
ethnic Albanian opposition appealed to the constitutional court. 
Koneska also asserts that “the problem was not in the contents of the measure, but 
in the manner in which it was being ‘rammed through’” (2014, 152). Specifically, 
the avoidance of inclusive and consensual institutions rang alarm bells among 
the ethnic Albanian community, as it appeared that education reforms were 
being used to change the rules of the political system. Indeed, by July 2010 
the constitutional court issued a verdict declaring that all education reforms 
(including the introduction of Macedonian language classes) were subject to 
double-majority approval in Parliament (Marusic 2010) and that the minister’s 
decision was unconstitutional. 
This overview of the implementation of the educational clauses in the OFA 
suggests that, as in Lebanon, power-sharing constrained the implementation of 
syncretistic education reforms while enabling the implementation of pluralistic 
provisions. More specifically, the attempt to implement the OFA’s provision for 
Macedonian-language instruction outside the new administrative structures of 
power-sharing were interpreted as a challenge to the political order and were 
contested both on the street and in court.
The Implementation of Northern Ireland’s Good Friday 
Agreement
The GFA’s commitment to “encourage and facilitate” integrated (Catholic/Irish/
Nationalist-Protestant/British/Unionist) education stemmed primarily from 
pressure from smaller mixed political parties, like the Women’s Coalition, at 
the negotiating table (BBC 2017). Research findings on the social impact of 
integrated education are largely positive (McGlynn et al. 2004; McGlynn 2007; 
Paolini et al. 2004; Hansson, Bones, and McCord 2013; Niens and Cairns 2005). 
Moreover, demographic and financial pressures have been a further impetus for 
the promotion of integrated schools. The 2006 Independent Strategic Review 
of Education suggested that a single integrated education system could lead to 
savings of up to £79.6 million in the Northern Ireland education budget (Hansson 
et al. 2013), and by 2011-2012 the education department found that Northern 
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Ireland’s schools were not operating at full capacity: there were 82,472 empty 
spaces (Hansson et al. 2013; Torney 2012). 
However, when asked about education reform since the conclusion of the GFA, a 
politician and member of the education committee in Stormont argued that there 
was a lot of “fiddling about with” education (Interview 28). Another politician 
reflected that “the systems haven’t changed much” (Interview 29), and a third 
argued that, “fundamentally, I think that most people on the street, if they were 
asked that question, would say that very little has changed in education since 
1998” (Interview 27). The president of the Integrated Education Fund reflected 
on this issue:
It’s almost like there’s a whole lot of issues within the Good 
Friday Agreement that have never been fulfilled. And those 
are the issues we have to get, because they are what I would 
call grassroots issues. Like education . . . I think people were so 
grateful at the time just to get peace on our streets that it was 
accepted. (Interview 30)
The available data corroborate the interviewees’ perspectives: Irish-language 
schooling has expanded but there has been no significant increase in integrated 
education (Hansson et al. 2013; Interview 31; Interview 39). In fact, integrated 
education has remained only one of four equally funded education sectors and, 
according to a local expert, it’s “a small sector that’s very closed within itself” 
(Interview 36). 
As in Lebanon and Macedonia, the reproduction of inclusive decision-making 
practices at all levels of the educational administration partly explains this. 
Immediately after conclusion of the peace agreement, the Northern Ireland 
Department of Education established a working group called Towards a Culture of 
Tolerance: Integrating Education. One of the members recalls that the committee 
was inclusive, comprising representatives of the three main education sectors 
(state controlled, Catholic maintained, and integrated), local authorities, and 
education experts (Interview 36). A member reports that a deadlock ensued at the 
first meeting, when the representatives of the Council for Catholic Maintained 
Schools called for the promotion of tolerance through existing school sectors 
rather than through the expansion of integrated schools (Gallagher 2005). The 
terms of reference of the working group were amended accordingly, resulting 
in loss of momentum and a limited long-term impact (Gallagher 2005). As in 
Lebanon and Macedonia, the inclusive institutional structures and decision-
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making patterns established with power-sharing made it essential to gain the 
consensus of all the affected communities for any education initiative.
The core political values of communal equality and autonomy also help to explain 
the partial implementation of the GFA’s educational provisions. An expert reflected 
on the puzzle that “all the surveys show that most parents want to send their 
children to integrated education or integrated schools but in reality [they] don’t 
[send them to these schools]” (Interview 8). A senior official at the Education 
and Skills Authority said that “actually, when it comes to the decisions that the 
parents make, the vast majority continue to decide to educate their children in 
the school type which would represent their family background” (Interview 33). 
A politician reflected that this is because parents treasure the particular school 
sectors that “uphold their positive sense of identity” (Interview 27).
In fact, the integration movement’s success in creating a broad consensus over 
the desirability of “educating children together” (O’Connor 2002, 64) precipitated 
attempts to portray all education sectors as catering to a mixed student population. 
For example, immediately following the signing of the GFA, the Catholic Bishops 
of Northern Ireland affirmed for the first time that “Catholic schools are open to 
children of all denominations,” adding that “the presence of children from other 
denominations is seen as an enrichment of the education experience” (2001, 8). The 
Protestant/Unionist community in turn has maintained that controlled schools 
are non-denominational and open to all. As a Unionist politician and chair of 
the education committee put it, “I’ve maintained that the controlled sector is the 
vehicle that should be used for making shared education” (Interview 43). Other 
prominent political representatives have attacked separate education as “a benign 
form of apartheid” (Belfast Telegraph 2010). 
Despite paying lip service to the syncretistic ambitions of the GFA, the main 
thrust of Northern Ireland’s education policy has been toward the enhancement 
of communal autonomy and equality in education (Interview 42). Successive 
election manifestos and government programs have confirmed a preference for 
“education policies that plan for separate development rather than structural 
change” (Hansson et al. 2013, 66). A 2014 high court ruling suggested that the 
implementation of initiatives like area planning and the entitlement framework 
created “a presumption in favour of the status quo” and accused the education 
department of failing to fulfill its statutory duty to “encourage and facilitate” 
integrated education (Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunal Services 2014). In 
this context, Northern Ireland’s schools continue to reproduce and crystallize the 
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boundaries between the ethnic and confessional communities that participated 
in the conflict and now share political power. 
The Implementation of Education Reforms
This brief overview of the implementation of the educational provisions codified in 
the peace agreements of Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia corroborates 
the implicit expectations presented in the literature (Lijphart 2008). Power-sharing 
constrains the implementation of syncretistic education reforms while enabling 
the implementation of pluralistic provisions. Most education provisions in the TA, 
GFA, and OFA pointed in a syncretistic direction (as shown in Table 2). However, 
the core political values of power-sharing, particularly communal equality and 
autonomy, and its inclusive and consensual decision-making practices affected 
the implementation of education initiatives, sidelining syncretistic provisions 
while enabling pluralistic ones in cases of both corporate and liberal power-
sharing. Wider studies of postconflict education policy suggest that this is also 
the case for provisions not explicitly codified in the peace agreements (Fontana 
2016; Shanks 2015).
The establishment of political power-sharing in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and 
Macedonia was paralleled by the reproduction of inclusive and consensual patterns 
of decision-making at all levels of the state administration. Walsh (2014) proposes 
that the legitimacy of decision-making and advisory bodies in postconflict 
societies is enhanced if their members represent the main communities that 
participated in conflict and that now share power. An analysis of education reform 
in constituencies that adopted power-sharing shows that inclusive committees and 
provisions for communal vetoes provide important safeguards that no reform will 
be enacted without the acquiescence of the previously warring parties it affects. 
Attempts to implement the peace settlements that bypassed the inclusive and 
consensual administrative structures were interpreted as a challenge to the new 
political order and were opposed outright, as in Macedonia. However, the inclusive 
and consensual approach to education reform did not foster swift decision-making 
or full implementation of the peace agreements, and syncretistic reforms such as 
Lebanon’s unified history curriculum were sidelined. 
Successive power-sharing governments also refrained from implementing policies 
that would take the wind out of the new political system’s sails. Reforms were fully 
implemented when they complied with the core values of equality and autonomy 
that underpin legitimate power-sharing. This underscores the importance of 
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considering education reform in its broader political context in order to design 
effective interventions. 
Finally, Lebanon is an example of corporate power-sharing, while Macedonia and 
Northern Ireland approximate liberal power-sharing. The literature suggests that 
corporate power-sharing is more likely to entrench and reproduce conflictual 
identities than its liberal counterpart, which “rewards whatever salient political 
identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or 
religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities” (McGarry and O’Leary 
2007, 675). This study suggests that, while liberal power-sharing allows for more 
flexibility in electoral outcomes, it may still “have legitimized difference to the 
extent that [it] left little space for the articulation of any discourse of a common 
good” (Gallagher 2005, 431) in other fields, including the reform of education 
systems. 
CONCLUSION
A growing body of literature is tackling the complex process of education reform 
in the aftermath of civil wars (Burde et al. 2017; Novelli et al. 2017). However, few 
studies have examined the complex relationship between education reform and 
constitutional and political structures (cf. Fontana 2016; Shanks 2015). To help 
map this uncharted territory, this article has examined the reforms of formal 
education explicitly codified in peace agreements that establish power-sharing. 
It explored the question, to what extent does the adoption of power-sharing 
constrain the type of education reforms included in peace agreements and their 
implementation? 
The literature on power-sharing suggests that the expectation was that pluralistic 
educational provisions would be paramount while syncretistic reforms would be 
marginalized (Lijphart 1996, 1977). This article tested this expectation through 
a cross-tabulation of the educational clauses codified in all the intrastate peace 
agreements concluded between 1989 and 2016 and a qualitative investigation 
of the peace agreements in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia, and of 
their implementation.
This study found that peace agreements prescribing multiple dimensions of power-
sharing are more likely to include education reforms, which suggests that this 
combination (power-sharing with education reform) may provide legitimacy and 
stability, particularly after identity-based conflicts. Analysis of the PAIC dataset 
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also suggests that peace agreements that include extensive power-sharing are 
more likely to include pluralistic educational provisions than those that do not 
(cf. Lijphart 1977). 
The qualitative analysis of the TA, GFA, and OFA refined the findings from 
the cross-tabulation of the PAIC dataset and underscored the fact that peace 
negotiations embed both pluralistic and syncretistic provisions in the same pact. 
The uneasy coexistence of syncretistic and pluralistic education reforms in the 
same peace agreement implies that there is ongoing disagreement about how 
schools can best support conflict transformation among conflicting parties. In 
this sense, peace agreements reflect the aggregation of the diverse interests of 
previously warring groups rather than their genuine synthesis. This finding has 
important implications, as the literature suggests that vague and inconsistent 
pacts are less likely to be implemented (Stedman et al. 2002). However, future 
studies are needed to shed light on the factors leading to the inclusion of specific 
power-sharing and education reforms in peace agreements, including the nature 
and characteristics of conflict, the relative strength of conflicting parties, and 
the extent of foreign involvement. Research that explores the extent to which 
specific contradictions constrain the implementation of postconflict education 
reforms is also needed.
This article confirms the expectations expressed in the power-sharing literature 
(Lijphart 1977). The implementation of education reforms does not depend on the 
prominence of education in the broader peace agreement. Both the TA and the 
OFA devoted considerable time to education policy, but the TA’s prescriptions were 
all but neglected. Implementation also does not result from positive international 
pressure. For example, there was broad donor support for the introduction of 
Macedonian language learning from first grade, but this proposal was side-
lined due to Albanian resistance. Finally, implementation does not depend on 
whether the reforms embody broad intercommunal consensus or are supported 
mainly by one community (Koneska 2014). Both the introduction of common 
history textbooks in Lebanon and the expansion of Albanian-language education 
in Macedonia drew strong support from one community (the Muslims and 
Albanians, respectively) and equally strong objections from others (the Christians 
and Macedonians, respectively). The latter was implemented, the former was not. 
The qualitative evidence shows that syncretistic education reforms were severely 
restricted in all cases, whereas pluralistic education reforms were most likely 
to be implemented in societies that adopted both liberal and corporate power-
sharing. Both varieties of power-sharing affected this implementation by altering 
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decision-making structures (i.e., by making reform bodies broadly inclusive of 
representatives of the previously warring communities) and by entrenching some 
core political values (particularly communal equality and autonomy). It will be 
essential to explore the complex interaction of these two factors in future research. 
This study has three main implications for the literature and for practice. 
First, it represents a step forward in understanding the complex relationship 
between politics and education reforms (Smith and Vaux 2003; UNESCO 2016). 
If education reforms are to be subject to the same bargaining process as other 
communal interests, more attention should be devoted to their formulation 
during the negotiating phase and to their ultimate implementation. Moreover, 
the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that the adoption of certain 
constitutional structures affects the design and implementation of education 
reforms in places affected by conflict. Thus, the idiosyncrasies of different political 
systems should be considered in order to maximize the impact of educational 
initiatives. 
Second, this work adds to the broader study of the design and implementation of 
peace agreements, which has overlooked the implementation of reform of social 
institutions. It confirms that the inconsistency of peace agreements complicates 
the implementation of specific reforms, and that the type of political system 
established at the end of a conflict can constrain the implementation of syncretistic 
educational provisions. This finding may be applied beyond the niche of education 
policy and should be further explored.
Finally, this study suggests that education fosters the legitimacy and stability 
of power-sharing by producing and reproducing its key political principles (cf. 
Fontana 2016). The PAIC dataset shows that agreements that include power-
sharing are more likely to include education reforms. The qualitative evidence 
suggests that, rather than purposefully transforming the narratives and identities 
at the heart of violent conflict, formal education helps to crystallize the boundaries 
between the national, ethnic, linguistic, and confessional communities that 
participated in a conflict and are subsequently sharing political power. Unlike 
electoral prescriptions, education policies are remarkably similar across liberal and 
corporate cases of power-sharing. As suggested by the power-sharing literature, 
this may foster the short-term stability, legitimacy, and resilience of power-
sharing (Lijphart 1977). However, education policies’ long-term impact should 
be investigated more critically. 
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APPENDIX 1: EXTENT OF EDUCATION REFORM IN PEACE AGREEMENTS
The following table provides a snapshot of the extent of education reform in 
different types of peace agreements, coded on a scale of 0-3. Peace agreements 
were assigned an index, depending on the number of aspects of education they 
address, with those scoring 3 having the most extensive approach to education 
reform. 
To build the index, all the educational provisions in peace agreements were coded 
into three broad categories: Contents, Access, and Governance. Reforms addressing 
content map changes to the educational curricula, as in the case of clause F5 
in Lebanon’s Taif Agreement: “The curricula shall be reviewed and developed 
in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural 
openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national 
education.” Reforms to access to education prescribe the expansion of educational 
provision to reach formerly marginalized communities or the introduction of 
quotas, as in the case of article 6.3 of Macedonia’s Ohrid Agreement: “The 
principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State 
universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the 
population of Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition 
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of the population of Macedonia.” Finally, reforms of the governance affect the 
funding, management, and overall structure of the education system. For example, 
Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement includes the intention to “place a 
statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish 
medium education in line with current provision for integrated education.”
It becomes apparent that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
extent of education reform between agreements that include multiple dimensions 
of power-sharing and those that do not include power-sharing. Yet, as observed 
in the article, agreements including power-sharing are more likely to include 
some education reform. They are also marginally more likely to adopt a more 
comprehensive approach to education reform: most of the agreements including 
multidimensional power-sharing alongside both syncretistic and pluralistic 
reforms address the contents, access, and governance of education. This does 
not apply to the agreements adopting only a syncretistic or a pluralistic approach 
to education reform.
N Mean Dimensions SD
Mode 
Dimensions
Without Multi-dimensional 
Power-Sharing 239 0.4 0.8 0
With Syncretistic Reforms 42 1.57 0.7 1
With Pluralistic Reforms 1 1 0 1
With Syncretistic and 
Pluralistic Reforms 13 2.08 0.86 2
With Multi-dimensional 
Power-Sharing 54 1.02 1.21 0
With Syncretistic Reforms 14 1.64 0.93 1
With Pluralistic Reforms 1 1 0 1
With Syncretistic and 
Pluralistic Reforms 12 2.58 0.51 3
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW LIST AND PROTOCOL
The author conducted a total of 75 interviews with educational experts, policy-
makers, and practitioners in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and FYR of Macedonia. 
They were asked slightly different follow-up questions, depending on their role 
and experience. This appendix reproduces a detailed list of the interviews cited 
in this article (48) and a sample Interview Protocol.
Interviews Cited in the Article
Person ID Description Case Location/Date
Interview 1 Senior Officer, Council for Catholic 
Maintained Schools
Northern Ireland Belfast, February 18, 2013
Interview 2 Expert of Primary Religious 
Education
Northern Ireland Telephone Interview, March 
25, 2013
Interview 3 Expert of Religious Education and 
Citizenship Education
Northern Ireland Belfast, February 19, 2013
Interview 4 Former Curriculum Developer for 
Local and Global Citizenship
Northern Ireland Belfast February 22, 2013
Interview 5 Senior Officer, Council for 
Curriculum, Examination and 
Assessment 
Northern Ireland Belfast, February 19, 2013
Interview 6 Head of Education Standards, 
Council for Catholic Maintained 
Schools
Northern Ireland Holywood, February 19, 
2013
Interview 7 Expert of Post-Primary Religious 
Education
Northern Ireland Telephone Interview, March 
8, 2013
Interview 8 Expert on Faith Schools and Inter-
Group Relations
Northern Ireland Belfast, March 4, 2013
Interview 9 President of the History Teachers’ 
Association of Macedonia
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 13, 2012
Interview 10 Albanian Historian FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 14, 2012
Interview 11 Journalist, Transitions Online, Edno 
Magazine
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 9, 2012
Interview 12 President of Civil - Centre for 
Freedom
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 18, 2012
Interview 13 Deputy Country Director Forum 
ZFD 
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 13, 2012
Interview 14 Policy Analyst, Centre for Research 
and Policymaking
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 10, 2012
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(cont.)
Person ID Description Case Location/Date
Interview 15 Independent Consultant and Drafter of 
the Strategy for Integrated Education
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 12, 2012
Interview 16 Professor of Education Lebanon Beirut, June 18, 2012
Interview 17 Expert on Citizenship Education Lebanon Beirut, June 28, 2012
Interview 18 Lebanese Association for Educational 
Studies Director and Curriculum 
Specialist
Lebanon Beirut, June 22, 2012, and
 July 13, 2012
Interview 19 Lebanese Academic and Former 
Director of the Centre for Educational 
Research and Development (1999-2001)
Lebanon Beirut, June 19, 2012
Interview 20 Senior Officer, Centre for Educational 
Research and Development
Lebanon Beirut, June 27, 2012
Interview 21 Lebanese Academic and Former 
Director of the Centre for Educational 
Research and Development (1994-1999)
Lebanon Telephone Interview, 
September 6, 2012
Interview 22 Project Manager, Youth for Tolerance Lebanon Beirut, June 20, 2012
Interview 23 ESCWA Regional Advisor Lebanon Beirut, July 3, 2012
Interview 24 Official in an International Mission FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 10, 2012
Interview 25 Head of Sector for Professional 
Development, Bureau for Development 
of Education
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 14, 2012
Interview 26 Official in International Organization FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 11,2012
Interview 27 Social Democratic and Labour Party 
Member of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and Former Member of the 
Education Committee
Northern Ireland Belfast, March 1, 2013
Interview 28 Ulster Unionist Party Member of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly and 
Member of the Education Committee
Northern Ireland Stormont, September 19, 
2013
Interview 29 Independent Member of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly
Northern Ireland Belfast, February 25, 2013
Interview 30 President, Integrated Education Fund Northern Ireland London, March 19, 2013
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(cont.)
Person ID Description Case Location/Date
Interview 31 Communications Director, Integrated 
Education Fund
Northern Ireland Belfast, March 4, 2013
Interview 32 Community Relations Coordinator, 
Department of Education Northern 
Ireland
Northern Ireland Bangor, February 26, 2013
Interview 33 Senior Officer, Education and Skills 
Authority
Northern Ireland Telephone Interview, March 
13, 2013
Interview 34 Lebanese Politician and Former 
Education Minister
Lebanon Beirut, June 27, 2012
Interview 35 Progressive Socialist Party Member, 
Member of the Advisory Committee on 
History Books
Lebanon Beirut, July 10, 2012
Interview 36 Professor of Education Northern Ireland Belfast, February 26, 2013
Interview 37 Education Program Director, 
Foundation Open Society Macedonia
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 17, 2012
Interview 38 Officer in International Delegation FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 11, 2012
Interview 39 Chief Executive, Council for Irish-
medium Schools
Northern Ireland Telephone Interview,  
March 5, 2013
Interview 40 Lebanese Academic and Political 
Analyst
Lebanon Beirut, July 6, 2012
Interview 41 Lebanese Jurist and Former Education 
Minister (2005-2008)
Lebanon Beirut, July 17, 2012
Interview 42 Senior Education Advisor, Council for 
Catholic Maintained Schools
Northern Ireland Belfast, February 18, 2013
Interview 43 Democratic Unionist Party Member of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly, Chair of 
Education Committee
Northern Ireland Stormont, February 27, 2013
Interview 44 Alliance Member of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and Minister for 
Employment and Learning
Northern Ireland Belfast, February 25, 2013
Interview 45 Education for Development Specialist, 
UNICEF
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 18, 2012
Interview 46 Academic and Former Minister of 
Education (1998-2002)
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 11, 2012
Interview 47 Officer in an International Donor 
Organization
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 14, 2012
Interview 48 Project Manager, Nansen Dialogue 
Centre
FYR of Macedonia Skopje, September 12, 2012
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Interview Protocol
Opening statements:
I would like to invite you to participate in this original research project. I am 
interested in how education evolves after the establishment of power-sharing. I 
am particularly interested in investigating whether power-sharing has an impact 
on priorities in educational reform, on the values and narratives underpinning 
education and on the way education is or is not employed as an instrument to 
transform conflicts and create social cohesion in divided societies. 
Discussion of further issues you may deem relevant is welcome. Should you feel 
uncomfortable with any of the questions, you can avoid answering it.
I have invited policy-makers and academics from across Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland and FYR of Macedonia to take part in this study. It is up to you to 
decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw without giving a reason. If you do decide to take part you will be given 
an information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.
The consent form asks for consent for:
• processing of personal information for the present research in accordance 
with the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998;
• the interview being recorded;
• disclosing personal details (or keeping them confidential).
Guiding Questions and Probes (to be adapted depending on the specific expertise 
of the interviewee):
1. What was the impact of the Taif Agreement/Good Friday Agreement/
Ohrid Agreement on education?
• Objectives of the peace agreement in regard to education;
• Specific examples of implemented or sidelined reforms; 
• Sources for the inclusion of specific reforms in the peace agreements.
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2. What are the most necessary education reforms in Lebanon/Northern 
Ireland/FYR of Macedonia? 
• Beneficiaries; 
• Champions of the reform.
3. What are the challenges to these reforms? 
• Obstacles with legislation (political);
• Obstacles with implementation (teachers’ responses; resources; 
expertise);
• Public reaction.
4. Does education contribute to peace and how? 
• Specific examples drawn from professional experience; 
• References to the existing education/political science literature if 
expert interviewee.
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